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Artistic Justice: How the Executive 
Branch Can Facilitate Nazi-Looted 
Art Restitution 
 
Eight decades after the Holocaust, many pieces of art stolen from Jewish 
families still sit in the state-owned museums of former Nazi-aligned 
regimes. In an effort to right old wrongs, plaintiffs are bringing suit in 
the United States against the foreign governments who retain the art 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s expropriation exception, 
which permits aggrieved plaintiffs to sue foreign countries for property 
that was illegally taken in violation of international law. But circuit 
courts are split as to whether these suits against foreign sovereigns 
should be allowed to go forward. This Note analyzes the divergent 
interpretations of the expropriation exception. Namely, whether the 
commercial activity of a foreign sovereign’s agencies and 
instrumentalities (in this case, a museum displaying stolen art) is 
enough to confer jurisdiction on the foreign sovereign itself. This Note 
argues that the executive should act to create a series of executive 
agreements that encourage arbitration or compensation through an 
established trust for Nazi-looted art claims. These agreements could 
reduce the foreign policy blunders of U.S. federal court litigation while 
giving survivors a real opportunity for restitution.  
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Then why bother with recovering it at all? Plundering is, 
after all, the handmaiden of war. And the world’s 
museums are filled with objects lifted during conflicts 
from the Romans on. But this is no Elgin Marbles 
controversy. The Nazis weren’t simply out to enrich 
themselves. Their looting was part of the Final Solution. 
They wanted to eradicate a race by extinguishing its 
culture as well as its people. This gives these works of art 
a unique resonance . . . . The objects are symbols of a 
terrible crime; recovering them is an equally symbolic 
form of justice.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of living survivors of the Holocaust is dwindling, 
but their stories endure as an instruction in humanity—a cautionary 
tale about allowing hate to run its course. Yet today, almost eighty 
years after the Holocaust, some wrongs have not been righted.  
One hundred thousand pieces of art and cultural relics that the 
Nazis stole during the Holocaust have not been returned to their 
original owners.2 Instead, these paintings sit in state-owned museums 
that profit off their display. The fight between the surviving families 
 
 1. Eric Gibson, The Art of to Whom Art Belongs, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 1999, 12:09 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB932095815373557335 [https://perma.cc/E5QA-BRAL]. 
 2.  See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Art Stolen by the Nazis Is Still Missing. Here’s How We Can 
Recover It., WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-one-should-
trade-in-or-possess-art-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9-831f-
3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7d94dade9394 [https://perma.cc/XA7W-
FB3Y] [hereinafter Art Stolen by the Nazis]. 
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and the former Nazi-aligned regimes that possess the paintings 
demonstrates a seemingly intractable problem—how to deliver some 
measure of justice to Holocaust survivors while balancing the complex 
foreign affairs implications that accompany them. No family’s story 
better exemplifies this struggle than the Herzogs’.  
Baron Mór Lipót Herzog loved art. So much so that, during his 
lifetime, he compiled a collection worth—at some estimates—$100 
million.3 Baron Herzog, a Hungarian nobleman, gained a reputation as 
one of Europe’s preeminent art collectors.4 Baron Herzog was also 
Jewish.5 When he died in 1934, he passed his collection on to his wife 
and children,6 presumably with the hope that it would stay within his 
family for many generations. Unfortunately, neither he nor the rest of 
the world foresaw the turmoil that would soon engulf Europe. 
As part of the campaign of humiliation and dehumanization 
against Hungary’s Jewish population, Nazi officials systematically 
deprived Hungarian Jews of their property, assets, and family 
treasures.7 In 1944, the Herzog family attempted to hide their vast art 
collection underneath a family factory.8 They did not succeed—Adolf 
Eichmann, a Nazi official, intercepted the effort and confiscated the 
artwork.9 After taking some choice pieces for display in Germany, he 
sent the remainder to the Hungarian government for its state-owned 
museums.10 The family was relatively lucky—most were able to escape, 
with the exception of one of Baron Herzog’s sons, who died doing forced 
labor.11 
The Herzog family’s art, known as the “Herzog Collection,” still 
sits in Hungary’s state-owned museums.12 The family has been 
embroiled in a seven-decade struggle to get their art collection home.13 
 
 3. Carol Vogel, Hungary Sued in Holocaust Art Claim, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/arts/design/28lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7Y23-PJDW]. 
The director of Hungary’s Museum of Fine Arts once bragged that acquiring the Herzog family’s 
art would make the museum a “world-level collection” rivaled only by the Museo del Prado in 
Madrid. See NICHOLAS M. O’DONNELL, A TRAGIC FATE: LAW AND ETHICS IN THE BATTLE OVER NAZI-
LOOTED ART 258 (2017). 
 4. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 255 (the collection included works from El Greco, Lucas 
Cranach the Elder, van Dyck, Velázquez, and prominent Hungarian painters like Mihály 
Munkácsy). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Vogel, supra note 3.  
 8. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 255–58. 
 12. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1098. 
 13. At one point, Hungary did return some of the collection to the family but only on short-
term loan; the family claims that they were harassed relentlessly for the return of the art, and 
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Most recently, they attempted to sue Hungary in the U.S. federal court 
system. But their effort failed when they lost in the D.C. Circuit and 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.14 
For the Herzogs,15 this struggle is about reclaiming their rightful 
property. Their lawsuit, however, highlights an area of ambiguity in 
U.S. law that has far-reaching implications—not just for descendants 
of Holocaust survivors seeking the return of family heirlooms but for 
U.S. foreign relations and foreign direct investment suits as well.  
Whether the Herzogs’ suit against Hungary should have moved 
forward—and by extension, whether other litigants should enjoy a more 
relaxed barrier to suits against foreign sovereigns—depends upon the 
proper interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 
and its expropriation exception.16 Without Supreme Court clarification 
on the exception, the lower courts are at an impasse—some courts 
interpret the expropriation exception in a way that mandates different 
jurisdictional requirements for foreign states and their agencies and 
instrumentalities, but others do not.17 The Herzogs’ suit is not unique. 
In fact, it is one of many cases brought by Holocaust survivors and their 
descendants against former Nazi-aligned regimes and other European 
countries over the last several decades.18  
This Note analyzes the divergent interpretations of the 
expropriation exception—the “alternative threshold approach” of the 
D.C. and Second Circuits and the “either-or approach” of the Ninth 
 
eventually they gave the pieces back for display in the Museum of Fine Arts in 1948. O’DONNELL, 
supra note 3, at 258–59. Once the Iron Curtain fell in Budapest, the family largely suspended its 
efforts to recover the art. Id. at 259. Decades later the U.S.S.R. dissolved, and one of Baron 
Herzog’s daughters sued in Hungary for the return of the art. Id. After an initial win ordered the 
return of eleven paintings, an appellate court reversed the decision. Id. Hungary promised to 
appoint a state commissioner to investigate claims such as the Herzog family’s, but never did. Id. 
Not long after, in July 2010, the Herzogs brought suit in the United States. Id.  
 14. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1098. The Supreme Court denied de Csepel’s petition for certiorari, 
so the family will not be able to sue Hungary in the United States federal court system absent 
action on the part of Congress. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (mem.) (2019) 
(denial of petition for certiorari). 
 15. The named plaintiff in this case is David de Csepel; while he does not share the Herzog 
name, he is the great-grandson of Baron Herzog. Vogel, supra note 3. 
 16. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). 
 17. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (holding that the jurisdictional requirements for 
foreign states and their agencies/instrumentalities are different under the FSIA); Altmann v. 
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to sue a foreign 
state and its agencies and instrumentalities under the same requirements), aff’d on other grounds, 
514 U.S. 677 (2004).  
 18. See, e.g., de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 
1032–34, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 589 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.  
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Circuit.19 This Note does not examine how various treaty commitments 
or exhaustion requirements might interact with such claims nor does it 
examine the merits of the Herzogs’ claims.20 Part I examines the text 
and history of the FSIA to give context to the exception’s purpose and 
meaning. Part II considers the current circuit split. Part III analyzes 
how the circuit split affects suits beyond Nazi-era art claims—
specifically foreign direct investment. Part IV proposes executive action 
that would address the unique jurisdictional and procedural challenges 
accompanying Nazi-era art restitution claims.  
While the jurisdictional issue addressed by this Note is 
relatively narrow, the broader field of Nazi-looted art cases is complex 
and intricate, often leading to protracted litigation and an amalgam of 
applicable law and standards.21 The FSIA provides some guidance on 
art restitution suits against former Nazi-aligned nations, but there is 
no comprehensive statute governing these types of claims.22 Thus, 
commentators have appropriately termed these cases “labyrinthine 
proceeding[s]” for their complex trajectory of trial and appellate court 
proceedings, and the jurisdictional and procedural hurdles that 
accompany them.23 These claims are “governed by a patchwork of state, 
federal, and transnational legal materials—American common law, 
statutory law, and constitutional law, along with public and private 
international law and the substantive laws of European countries.”24 
Experts in this field call the withheld artwork of Jewish Holocaust 
victims “the last prisoners of war,”25 a phrase that reflects the pain 
associated with the remembrance of the Nazis’ attempt to destroy the 
legacy of European Jews.26 In some sense, the plaintiffs in these cases 
 
 19. Compare de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (using the “alternative threshold approach”), 
and Garb, 440 F.3d at 589 (using the “alternative threshold approach”), with Altmann, 317 F.3d 
at 958 (using the “either-or approach”). 
 20. There is also a wealth of litigation on these issues. E.g., Philipp v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 21. BRUCE L. HAY, NAZI-LOOTED ART AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN CASES 5–6 (2017). 
 22. Id. at 6. 
 23. Id. at 5–6. 
 24. Id. at 6.  
 25. Valerie J. Nelson, Elan Steinberg Dies at 59; Former Head of the World Jewish Congress, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012) http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/11/local/la-me-elan-steinberg-
20120411 [https://perma.cc/3NQF-T4YY] (stating that Elan Steinberg is credited with first calling 
Nazi-looted art pieces “the last prisoners of war”).  
 26. See Charles Dellheim, Framing Nazi Art Loot, in THE ART OF BEING JEWISH IN MODERN 
TIMES 321 (Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett & Jonathan Karp eds., 2008): 
What began mainly as a story about Nazis stealing art treasures recovered by 
courageous “monuments men” has gradually been cast as a Jewish tragedy. Whereas 
Nazi art theft was first regarded as an assault on national cultural legacies, it has now 
become a chapter in the story of the Shoah. The fate of the “last prisoners of war” . . . has 
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are also prisoners—they are trapped by this labyrinthine legal system 
that is complex and confusing, adding more urgency to find a solution 
expediently.27 Regardless of the merits of one jurisdictional argument 
versus another, this is an area of the law that represents deeply 
personal and trying memories for its plaintiffs. 
I. THE ADVENT OF THE FSIA AND WHY FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
MATTERS 
A. An Overview of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Law 
Prior to the 1976 enactment of the FSIA, no codified law 
regarding the immunity of foreign states in U.S. federal courts 
existed.28 The concept of foreign sovereign immunity originated in the 
time of monarchs.29 Because sovereign monarchs were equal to each 
other—par in parem non habet imperium—one sovereign monarch 
could not be subject to suit at the behest of another.30 Even as monarchs 
dwindled on the world stage, states continued to honor this 
commitment to one another, justifying it as a matter of equality and 
dignity amongst the nations.31 
One of the earliest—and certainly one of the most prominent—
expressions of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States is Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.32 In 
The Schooner Exchange, two U.S. citizens attempted to sue the French 
government in a U.S. court for ship theft.33 Marshall’s opinion held that 
 
become a touchstone for memory—memories of belonging and betrayal, courage and 
collaboration.  
 27. Si Frumkin, a Holocaust survivor, once wrote of his frustration with the U.S. 
government’s failure to assist him in recovering lost possessions: “I am a law-abiding American 
citizen . . . . In return, I expect my government to fulfill its obligations to me . . . .” Si Frumkin, 
Why Won’t Those SOBs Give Me My Money?: A Survivor’s Perspective, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 92 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 
2006). 
 28. See Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 156 (1981) (“[The FSIA’s] provisions effect substantial changes from 
prior law, which was outdated, uncertain and heavily influenced by foreign policy considerations 
of the executive branch of government.”). 
 29. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 314–15 (4th 
ed. 2015). 
 30. Id. at 315. 
 31. Id. (“Over time, the idea of an identity between state and federal ruler faded away, but 
states continued to extend to other states an absolute immunity from jurisdiction to adjudicate 
and jurisdiction to enforce. Governments justified these broad immunities by reference to the 
dignity, equality, and independence of states.”). 
 32. See id. at 316–17 (providing The Schooner Exchange as an example of the classical view 
of sovereign immunity); see also The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 117–20 (1812). 
 33. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117–20.  
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the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity barred the domestic suit 
against the French government for two principal reasons: (1) failing to 
protect foreign sovereigns against suit in domestic courts would 
undermine the equality of nations and (2) permitting suit against other 
nations could potentially damage U.S. foreign policy initiatives and 
goals.34 In his opinion, Marshall emphasized judicial deference to the 
executive in the realm of foreign affairs.35  
In response to increasing globalization over one hundred years 
after The Schooner Exchange, the State Department issued the Tate 
Letter in 195236 as a plea to courts to recognize the “restrictive theory” 
of sovereign immunity.37 The restrictive theory differs from the absolute 
theory of sovereign immunity in that it grants state immunity only for 
public acts (jure imperii), not private ones (jure gestionis).38 The Tate 
Letter was largely ineffective. One main reason it was ineffective was 
that it failed to adequately distinguish public acts from private acts.39 
Further complicating matters, different branches approached 
immunity with varying standards, making it difficult for foreign 
litigants to nail down a clear jurisdictional rule.40 Foreign litigants 
believed the determination of who received immunity was largely a 
political one.41 The Tate Letter exposed a need for a codified, uniform 
set of criteria in immunity determinations.42  
 
 34. Id. at 136–39; see also Hill, supra note 28, at 163–64 (explaining Marshall’s rationale for 
extending sovereign immunity to foreign states).  
 35. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 146. This idea was reinforced in Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffman, where the Court explained, “[I]t is a guiding principle in determining whether a court 
should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to 
embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs.” 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); see DUNOFF 
ET AL., supra note 29, at 318. 
 36. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. 
 37. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 319. The Tate Letter also stated that, going forward, 
the U.S. State Department would adhere to “the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 
320 (quoting Tate Letter, supra note 36, at 984). 
 38. Id. at 319. 
 39. Id. at 321. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (“Dissatisfaction with the perceived politicization of the process for deciding 
immunity and a desire for greater predictability led practitioners, scholars, and the State 
Department itself to urge reforms that would remove the Department from the process of 
determining immunity.”). 
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B. Why a Statutory Mandate on Sovereign Immunity? Explaining the 
FSIA’s Purpose 
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976—a much needed update to 
the Tate Letter immunity regime—which codified the restrictive view 
of sovereign immunity and outlined the exclusive means for obtaining 
jurisdiction in the United States over foreign nations and their agencies 
and instrumentalities.43 The FSIA provides that all foreign sovereigns 
are immune from suit in the United States unless they fall within one 
of several enumerated exceptions,44 including, but not limited to, “(1) 
waiver, (2) commercial acts, (3) expropriations, (4) rights in certain 
kinds of property in the United States, (5) non-commercial torts, and (6) 
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards.”45 Extensive litigation 
emerged surrounding the breadth and scope of the exceptions.46 
Notably, in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA applied 
retroactively to conduct that took place before its enactment—a 
significant win for Holocaust victims and their descendants wishing to 
bring suit against foreign governments in U.S. courts because the 
Holocaust preceded the FSIA’s enactment.47 
The policy concerns underlying the passage of the FSIA also 
instruct how courts should interpret the Act. Congress shifted the 
responsibility for immunity determinations from the executive to the 
judiciary to tamp down on arbitrary immunity designations and provide 
robust guidance on when to deny immunity.48 The FSIA also clarified 
and standardized the field of immunity determinations; but for the 
listed exceptions, states are presumptively immune.49 The Act also 
anticipates the tension between providing a forum for aggrieved 
plaintiffs and guarding against judicial interference in the realm of 
 
 43. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012); DUNOFF ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 320.  
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320. 
 45. David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. 
CTR. 41 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/FSIAGuide2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZR4Q-JGZP]. 
 46. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (declaring unanimously that the 
FSIA does not govern foreign officials’ immunity claims); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 
362–63 (1993) (holding that Saudi Arabia’s imprisonment and torture of an American did not 
qualify as commercial activity under the FSIA’s 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) exception); Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618–19 (1992) (establishing the “direct effects” test for 
the FSIA’s commercial activity exception).  
 47. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). The story of the Altmann litigation 
is portrayed in the 2015 movie Woman in Gold. WOMAN IN GOLD (BBC Films 2015). 
 48. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320 (explaining how “[d]issatisfaction with the perceived 
politicization of the process for deciding immunity and a desire for greater predictability led” to 
the FSIA, which placed immunity determinations in the hands of the judiciary).  
 49. Id. 
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foreign relations, as evidenced by the FSIA’s statement of purpose, 
which declares Congress’s intent to “protect the rights of both foreign 
states and litigants in United States courts.”50 Congress was concerned 
that “err[ing] in the former direction could implicate foreign policy 
concerns, while being over solicitous of the status of foreign states could 
make it impossible for aggrieved parties to be made whole.”51 
C. The Expropriation Exception and Court Confusion 
Despite the FSIA’s enactment, courts still struggle to balance 
the competing interests of foreign relations and court access for 
aggrieved plaintiffs. The case law interpreting the expropriation 
exception is a prime example. Courts are split between two 
interpretations of the exception,52 with each interpretation vindicating 
either foreign relations or court access.53 These dueling approaches 
came to head in the de Csepel litigation, where the application of the 
expropriation exception was one of the key issues.54 The expropriation 
exception is codified at § 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA and provides that 
foreign states are not immune from U.S. jurisdiction in cases 
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that 
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; 
or that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is 
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.55 
Put simply, the expropriation exception requires (1) the taking 
of property that violates international law and (2) a commercial activity 
connection to the United States.56 In cases alleging art theft by Nazi-
associated regimes, where the facts are not in dispute, the first 
 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012); Jason E. Myers, Note, Preserving International Comity: The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 90 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 913, 914 (2017).  
 51. Myers, supra note 50 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign 
Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in 
Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 125 (2008)). 
 52. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1104–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Altmann v. 
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 
677 (2004). 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012); de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1100. 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).  
 56. Case Comment, D.C. Circuit Interprets Expropriation Exception to Allow Genocide 
Victims to Sue Their Own Government, 131 HARV. L. REV. 650, 652 (2017) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit 
Interprets] (“First, there must be property ‘taken in violation of international law,’ and second, 
there must be a commercial nexus—some connection between the defendants or the property and 
a commercial activity in the United States.”). 
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requirement is easily satisfied, as courts have ruled that the taking of 
property during the commission of a genocide violates international 
law.57 The exact nature and parameters of the commercial activity in 
connection to the foreign sovereign itself is the subject of the hotly 
debated circuit split examined in this Note.58 
Federal courts take divergent approaches to the FSIA’s 
expropriation exception, which provides two possible commercial 
activity nexus requirements.59 The first commercial activity nexus 
refers to the language addressing foreign states;60 the second 
commercial activity nexus refers to language tied to agencies and 
instrumentalities.61 The first commercial activity nexus requires that 
the property at issue is both (1) present in the United States and (2) 
being used in connection with a commercial activity in the United 
States.62 The second commercial activity nexus, on the other hand, does 
not require property to be in the United States.63 It merely requires that 
the property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
the foreign country and that the property is then used for a commercial 
activity in the United States.64 Some courts hold that the jurisdictional 
requirements for states and a state’s agencies and instrumentalities are 
different.65 In other words, some courts hold that a plaintiff must satisfy 
either the first or second commercial activity nexus depending on 
whether the defendant is a foreign nation or a foreign nation’s agencies 
or instrumentalities.66 Other courts have held that satisfying either 
commercial activity nexus is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a 
 
 57. Id. (“[T]he Hungarian government’s seizure of property from Jewish citizens constituted 
genocide, and genocide is a violation of international law . . . . Judge Tatel concluded that the 
plaintiffs had described a taking of property in violation of international law that could be covered 
by the expropriation exception.”).  
 58. See infra Part II.  
 59. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (holding that the jurisdictional requirements for 
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities are different under the FSIA); Altmann v. 
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining to distinguish between 
jurisdictional requirements for states and their agencies and instrumentalities), aff’d on other 
grounds, 514 U.S. 677 (2004).  
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (“[P]roperty or any property exchanged for such property is 
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state . . . .”). 
 61. See id. (“[P]roperty or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by 
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in 
a commercial activity in the United States . . . .”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1104–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 66. Id. 
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foreign nation.67 The FSIA defines agencies and instrumentalities as 
any entity 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of 
a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other 
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) 
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 
1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.68 
The heart of the dispute is whether the commercial activity of a 
foreign sovereign’s agencies and instrumentalities is enough to confer 
jurisdiction on the foreign sovereign itself. Put another way, can a 
plaintiff secure jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign merely by 
satisfying § 1605(a)(3)’s second commercial activity nexus? While the 
Ninth Circuit extends jurisdiction to the foreign state itself if a plaintiff 
satisfies the second commercial activity nexus, the D.C. Circuit and the 
Second Circuit do not.69 The commercial activity is often the most 
critical question in these inquiries because the commercial activity is 
the jurisdictional hook—without it, a plaintiff cannot establish a U.S. 
federal court’s power over a foreign-state defendant.  
It is worth noting that the commercial nexus inquiry related to 
the expropriation exception is distinct from the commercial activity 
exception of the FSIA.70 The commercial activity exception of the FSIA 
concerns the level of commercial behavior necessary to waive immunity 
for a foreign sovereign that engages in business in the United States, 
whereas the commercial nexus inquiry of the expropriation exception is 
tailored to the context of takings in violation of international law.71 
While there would seem to be overlap between the two exceptions on 
the question of commercial activity, the expropriation exception 
controls when a foreign country, instrumentality, or agency engages in 
an illegal taking.72 The FSIA does not define what a taking is but “the 
provision was intended to refer to the nationalization or expropriation 
of property by a foreign sovereign without payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation as required by international 
law.”73 
 
 67. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other 
grounds, 514 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). 
 69. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 589 (2d Cir. 
2006); Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 70. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (the commercial activity exception), with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(3) (the expropriation exception). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)–(3). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Stewart, supra note 45, at 56. 
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This area of law demonstrates the perennial tension between 
justice and practicality. There is clearly a morally desirable result 
here—these victims should get their day in court and the opportunity 
to argue on the merits. This is also a scenario, however, in which the 
most just result may not be the best one due to practical constraints, 
such as foreign policy concerns.  
II. THE JURISDICTION CONUNDRUM: HOW THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON 
INTERPRETING THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION 
A. The D.C. and Second Circuits: The Alternative Threshold Approach 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Second 
Circuit maintain that the expropriation exception sets up two separate 
jurisdictional requirements—and thus two alternative thresholds—for 
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities.74 The D.C. 
Circuit has considered this issue at length, while the Second Circuit has 
not expanded on why it chose to interpret § 1605(a)(3) as establishing 
two different jurisdictional requirements.75 Because the Second Circuit 
has not specified why it adheres to the alternative threshold approach, 
this Note uses the D.C. Circuit’s analysis as representative of the 
argument in favor of two separate jurisdictional requirements.  
The D.C. Circuit did not always follow the alternative threshold 
approach.76 Before the de Csepel case, the precedent on this issue was 
unclear at best—prior D.C. Circuit cases Simon v. Republic of Hungary 
and Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation conflicted on how 
to interpret the expropriation exception.77 In Simon, the court 
interpreted the expropriation exception as having separate 
requirements for jurisdiction for a nation-state and its agencies or 
 
 74. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Garb, 440 F.3d at 589. 
 75. The Second Circuit used the alternative threshold approach in Garb v. Republic of 
Poland, holding that satisfying the expropriation exception’s second commercial activity nexus 
requirement was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the foreign state itself, but rather just the 
agency or instrumentality at issue. 440 F.3d at 589 (“The first of these alternative showings sets 
a higher threshold of proof for suing foreign states in connection with alleged takings by requiring 
that the property at issue be ‘present in the United States.’ ”). The court, in deciding that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(3) established alternative thresholds, failed to support its conclusion with a 
comprehensive analysis. See id. (failing to elucidate why alternative thresholds existed in 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). 
 76. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that 
agencies and instrumentalities and foreign states had different requirement for jurisdiction to 
attach based on the expropriation exception); Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian 
Federation, 528 F.3d 934, 947–48, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to distinguish between 
requirements for foreign states, agencies, and instrumentalities in conferring jurisdiction).  
 77. Simon, 812 F.3d at 146; Chabad, 528 F.3d at 947–48, 955. 
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instrumentalities.78 But in Chabad, the D.C. Circuit did not distinguish 
between foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities and 
permitted suit based on the satisfaction of the second commercial 
activity nexus alone.79 This discrepancy is an important demonstration 
of the lower courts’ confusion on how to resolve this issue. 
The de Csepel case provided the D.C. Circuit with the 
opportunity to settle this conflicting precedent.80 The plaintiffs in de 
Csepel favored the lower bar established by Chabad, while Hungary 
argued that Simon was the controlling precedent.81 To resolve this 
conflict, the court read the Chabad case as failing to hold one way or 
the other on this issue, making Simon, which was quite clear about the 
distinction, the binding precedent.82 According to the court, the Chabad 
decision had “no precedential effect” because it was a “cursory and 
unexamined . . . drive-by jurisdictional ruling[ ].”83 
The de Csepel court very clearly held that for a U.S. court to 
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state, the property at issue must be 
both (1) present in the United States and (2) used for a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States.84 The D.C. Circuit reads the 
expropriation exception as permitting a more lenient approach to the 
jurisdictional requirements for agencies and instrumentalities—
requiring neither that the property be in the United States nor that the 
commercial activity in the United States relates to the property.85 
Agencies and instrumentalities must only satisfy the second 
commercial activity nexus of the exception. 
For example, under the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation, if a 
plaintiff sues to return a family artifact displayed in a foreign nation’s 
state-owned museum, the artifact is obviously not in the United States, 
so jurisdiction over a foreign state will not attach under the first 
commercial activity nexus.86 But if the state-owned museum sells 
books, posters, or other souvenirs in the United States, then the second 
 
 78. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107 (“[E]ven were we not bound by Simon, we would hold that 
a foreign state retains its immunity unless the first clause of the commercial-activity nexus 
requirement is met.”). 
 79. Chabad, 528 F.3d at 947–48, 955. 
 80. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08. 
 81. Id. at 1104–05. 
 82. Id. at 1105 (“The precise question, then, is whether the Chabad court held that a foreign 
state loses immunity if the second nexus requirement is met. We think it did not.”); D.C. Circuit 
Interprets, supra note 56, at 653.  
 83. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1106 (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1107. 
 86. See id. (explaining the D.C. Circuit’s theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)’s application). 
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commercial activity nexus of the expropriation exception is satisfied.87 
It does not matter whether the specific artifact at issue is related to the 
domestic sale of souvenirs—the state-owned museum’s commercial 
activity in the United States is sufficient to gain jurisdiction over the 
state-owned museum as an agency or instrumentality.88 By contrast, if 
the plaintiff wished to secure jurisdiction over the foreign nation as 
well, she would need to demonstrate that the disputed artifact was in 
fact present in the United States and the commercial activity in 
question was related to the disputed artifact.89 For example, loaning the 
disputed artwork for display in the United States would likely be 
sufficient.90  
Judge Randolph, the lone dissenter in de Csepel, considered 
Simon’s separate jurisdictional requirements to be a mistake—an 
oversight by the Simon court because it failed to realize that Chabad 
was the controlling precedent on this issue.91 He suggested that the de 
Csepel majority’s stressed reconciliation of Simon in light of Chabad 
was an attempt to save face after judicial error,92 and he went to great 
lengths to dismantle the reasoning behind the majority’s holding that 
Simon was a correct interpretation of the law, rather than Chabad.93 
B. The Ninth Circuit: The Either-Or Approach 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit does not differentiate between 
foreign sovereigns and their agencies and instrumentalities for 
jurisdictional purposes under the expropriation exception—thus, a 
plaintiff can establish jurisdiction over both by satisfying the second 
 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332–33 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding 
that contracting with American museums, receiving consideration for the art loan, and sending 
employees to oversee the painting’s safe arrival were sufficient to establish a “commercial activity” 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)); Ingrid Wuerth, An Art Museum Amendment to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, LAWFARE (Jan. 2, 2017, 12:48 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/art-museum-amendment-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act 
[https://perma.cc/32WR-ZZTJ].  
 91. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1114 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
only reasonable explanation for Simon’s treatment of Chabad is that it made a mistake. The 
majority’s decision in this case only compounds the error.”); cf. id. at 1107 (majority opinion) 
(explaining that the plaintiffs in Simon raised the Chabad argument in their briefs so the court 
was not “unaware” of the precedent).  
 92. Id. at 1114 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 93. See id. at 1113–14 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996)) 
(outlining the court’s misinterpretation of Chabad’s analysis and describing how the court’s 
selective interpretation of Chabad conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe, 
which stressed that “it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to 
that result by which we are bound”). 
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commercial activity nexus alone.94 A litigant can haul a foreign state 
into a U.S. court when an agency or instrumentality owns the disputed 
property and engages in commercial activity in the United States; thus, 
under this interpretation, a litigant need only show that the second 
commercial nexus is satisfied to confer jurisdiction on a foreign nation.95 
Compared to the approach of the D.C. and Second Circuits, this 
jurisdictional barrier is much less demanding.96 In both Cassirer v. 
Kingdom of Spain and Altmann v. Republic of Austria, the Ninth 
Circuit permitted the plaintiffs to sue foreign nations, relying solely on 
the satisfaction of the second part of the commercial activity nexus 
requirement of the expropriation exception.97 Notably, neither opinion 
explained the courts’ reasoning behind permitting suit against the 
relevant foreign sovereign.98 Rather, the Ninth Circuit accepted the 
language of the expropriation exception without further exploration.99 
The text was sufficiently clear for the Ninth Circuit—either prong is 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign nation.100 
C. Dueling Approaches 
Considerable debate exists about the proper interpretation of 
the expropriation exception based on the statutory language of 
§ 1605(a)(3).101 Both sides of this argument claim that their reading of 
 
 94. See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1032–34, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (allowing 
plaintiffs to sue Spain after satisfying the second prong of the expropriation exception); Altmann 
v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting suit against Austria to go 
forward on a showing that the second prong was satisfied), aff’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 677 
(2004). 
 95. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 
579, 589 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining how the Second Circuit’s interpretation sets a higher standard 
for the foreign state than the agency or instrumentality). 
 97. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 98. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 99. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 100. See Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958. 
 101. For convenience, here is the relevant statutory language:  
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case . . . (3) in which rights in property taken in violation 
of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property 
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 
in the United States;  
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). 
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the FSIA is the most natural and logical,102 and both sides claim that a 
contrary reading would lead to absurd results.103 
1. The Alternative Threshold Approach’s Functionalism  
Supporters of the D.C. Circuit’s alternative threshold 
approach—that foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities 
have separate jurisdictional requirements under the FSIA—contend 
that this is the only logical reading of § 1605(a)(3).104 This approach 
tracks other jurisdictional jurisprudence, which usually requires a 
connection to the United States to impose jurisdiction on a foreign 
corporate defendant.105 Jurisdiction over a foreign defendant will lie 
only if that entity—not a separate entity—has engaged with or has 
contacts with the United States.106 Furthermore, advocates of this 
approach argue that the relationship between a subsidiary and parent 
corporation is similar to that between a foreign state and its agencies 
 
 102. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 
784 (2019) (mem.) (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 1028055, at *29: 
[The] text [of the FSIA] is unambiguous . . . . [I]t provides that a foreign entity lacks 
immunity when (1) it is a foreign state, (2) rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue, and (3) the relevant property is owned or operated by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state that is engaged in commercial activity in 
the United States; 
Brief in Opposition at 31, de Csepel, 139 S. Ct. 784 (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 2383591, at *31 
(“Because neither the FSIA, its legislative history, nor case law support the ‘counter-textual’ 
reading advocated by Petitioners, review by this Court is not warranted.” (citation omitted)).  
 103. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“To conclude that 
the foreign state loses its immunity if either clause is satisfied would produce an anomalous result: 
the court would have no jurisdiction over the agencies and instrumentalities that actually own or 
operate the expropriated property.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 27–28 
(“Congress could not have intended simultaneously to abrogate foreign states’ immunity to 
expropriation suits and to create a giant loophole that could prevent adjudication of such claims.”). 
 104. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, de Csepel, 139 S. Ct. 784 (No. 17-
1165), 2018 WL 6382956, at *11 [hereinafter United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel]:  
That text and structure as a whole is most naturally read as establishing two distinct 
tracks for obtaining jurisdiction, depending on the kind of entity whose immunity is at 
stake. . . . On that understanding, an entity’s exposure to suit in U.S. courts depends 
on the connection between the expropriated property and that entity’s own U.S. 
commercial activities. A plaintiff thus cannot mix and match, using the looser ‘agency 
or instrumentality’ standard to bootstrap jurisdiction over the foreign state itself. 
 105. See id. 
If a private foreign museum engaged in commercial activity in the United States, for 
example, then that activity would naturally be expected to provide a basis for suing that 
museum on related claims in a U.S. court. But that activity would not ordinarily provide 
a basis for using a separate corporate parent . . . .  
(citations omitted). 
 106. Id. (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality opinion) 
and Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 887–88 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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and instrumentalities.107 As courts have been reluctant to confer 
jurisdiction automatically over the parent corporation simply because 
its subsidiary has contacts in the United States, advocates argue that 
the same logic should apply to the relationship between foreign states 
and their agencies and instrumentalities.108  
Additionally, proponents of this approach argue that separating 
the jurisdictional requirements of § 1605(a)(3) honors the “well-worn 
distinction between foreign states and agencies and instrumentalities” 
in the FSIA.109 They assert that Congress enacted the FSIA against the 
background principle that statutory codification of immunity standards 
should protect international comity,110 which has since informed the 
general rule that distinct government agencies and instrumentalities 
should be treated separately from their sovereigns.111  
Proponents also maintain that when Congress has deviated from 
this background rule, it has been explicit about its intention.112 For 
example, Congress was clear in erasing the distinction between states 
and their agencies and instrumentalities to allow victims of state-
sponsored terrorism to collect on particular judgments.113 Conversely, 
no such language appears in the expropriation exception.114 However, 
this point belies the fact that Congress, in defining “foreign state,” 
included agencies and instrumentalities as part of the definition—and 
 
 107. Id. at 11–12.  
 108. See id. (analogizing jurisdictional norms for corporations to those for foreign states). 
 109. Id. at 6 (quoting de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2017)); 
see also Lauren Bursey, Comment, They’re People Too: Why U.S. Courts Should Give Foreign 
Agencies and Instrumentalities Due Process Rights Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA), 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 230 (2016) (“FSIA recognizes the reality that agencies and 
instrumentalities are entities separate from the government and, accordingly treat [sic] them 
different [sic] than states.”).  
 110. See United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 12:  
The expectation that jurisdiction over a foreign entity depends on that entity’s own 
contacts with the United States is particularly strong in the FSIA . . . . As this Court 
has long recognized, “[d]ue respect for the actions taken by foreign sovereigns and for 
principles of comity between nations” support a background rule “that government 
instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their 
sovereign should normally be treated as such.”  
(quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 
(1983), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012), as recognized in Rubin v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 14 (providing the example of Congress expressly deviating from the rule in 28 
U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)). 
 113. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012) and Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 823). Congress enacted 
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1), which provides a list of factors to consider when holding an agency or 
instrumentality liable for the actions of a foreign sovereign. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); Rubin, 138 S. 
Ct. at 822–23. The default presumption is that foreign states and their agencies and 
instrumentalities were separate legal entities. See Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 822. 
 114. United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 14. 
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that this definition was explicitly adopted for the expropriation 
exception, arguably eviscerating the distinction between the two.115 
The FSIA’s commercial activity exception also supports a 
background principle that the FSIA should treat agencies and 
instrumentalities differently from foreign sovereigns.116 As an example 
of the careful distinction between foreign states and their agencies and 
instrumentalities under the FSIA, supporters of this approach note that 
a foreign nation loses immunity status under the commercial activity 
exception only if the claim against the state—as opposed to the agency 
or instrumentality—satisfies that exception.117 By analogy, they argue, 
this logic should extend to the expropriation exception.118 
Additionally, this alternative threshold approach would guard 
against anomalous outcomes.119 The D.C. Circuit has explained:  
To conclude that the foreign state loses its immunity if either clause is satisfied would 
produce an anomalous result: the court would have no jurisdiction over the agencies and 
instrumentalities that actually own or operate the expropriated property. That is because, 
although the FSIA generally allows for “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” 
to count as a “foreign state,” the agencies or instrumentalities would fail to 
satisfy either of the expropriation exception’s two clauses if considered to be the relevant 
“foreign state” throughout the exception. Take this case. The family would be unable to 
pursue its claims against the very entities that actually possess the Herzog collection—
the museums and the university—because the collection is not “present in the United 
States” (clause one) nor “owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality” of the 
museums and the university (clause two). Thus, the expropriation exception’s two clauses 
make sense only if they establish alternative thresholds a plaintiff must meet depending 
on whether the plaintiff seeks to sue a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of 
that state.120 
Furthermore, in dissolving the distinction between foreign 
states and their instrumentalities, the plaintiff would be able to sue a 
foreign sovereign that engaged in no commercial activity in the United 
 
 115. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1112 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Randolph, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how the Act defines “foreign state” to 
include agencies and instrumentalities). 
 116. See United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 13 (“When applying other 
FSIA exceptions to immunity from suit, the courts of appeals have consistently recognized that a 
foreign state ‘does not lose immunity merely because one of its agencies and instrumentalities 
satisfies an FSIA exception.’ ” (emphasis added)). 
 117. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107 (majority opinion) (“For that reason, a foreign state loses 
its immunity under the commercial-activity exception only if the claim against the state—as 
opposed to the agency or instrumentality—satisfies that exception.”); United States Amicus Brief 
in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 13 (“For example, under the FSIA’s commercial activity exception, 
28 U.S.C. [§] 1605(a)(2), the courts of appeals have applied the presumption to hold that ‘a foreign 
sovereign is not amenable to suit based upon the acts’ of an instrumentality, unless the Bancec 
presumption is overcome.”).  
 118. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107; United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, 
at 6. 
 119. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107. 
 120. Id. at 1107–08 (citation omitted). 
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States so long as the sovereign’s agency or instrumentality owning or 
operating the property did.121 This result seems counterintuitive, as it 
would be easier to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state if it did not 
own the property at issue, but rather one of its agencies and 
instrumentalities did.122 Because the commercial activity bar is higher 
for the first clause—requiring presence of property in the United States 
and a commercial activity nexus to that property, as opposed to mere 
commercial activity—a plaintiff could more easily sue a foreign-state 
defendant by simply showing some level of commercial activity by an 
agency or instrumentality.123 
As advocates have noted, however, this argument falls flat in 
certain factual scenarios—for example, in the case of the Herzogs, it is 
not mere “happenstance” that their family’s prized paintings are in 
Hungary’s state-owned museums.124 Though Hungary’s state-owned 
museums possess the paintings, Hungary is one of the parties directly 
responsible for their theft in the first place: after receiving the stolen 
art from Nazi soldiers, Hungary put the loot on display.125 Holding 
Hungary accountable for the actions of its agencies and 
instrumentalities is not an odd or anomalous result under these facts.126  
Still, the D.C. Circuit in de Csepel worried that this approach 
would allow plaintiffs carte blanche to sue “any and all agencies and 
instrumentalities of a foreign state however unconnected to the United 
States,” as long as the foreign nation had possession of the property at 
issue in connection with its commercial activity in the United States.127  
2. The Either-Or Approach’s Clear-Eyed Reading 
Meanwhile, proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s either-or 
approach, which levies jurisdiction against a foreign state if either 
prong is satisfied, argue that the first words of the statutory provision 
 
 121. Id. at 1108. 
 122. See id. (explaining this odd result and stating that the plaintiff “could sue any and all 
agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state however unconnected to the United States, so 
long as the foreign state itself possesses the property in connection with a commercial 
activity . . . in the United States”). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). 
 124. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2012) 
(mem.) (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 2684553, at *10. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. (“Hungary can reap the financial benefits that flow to the state-owned museums 
through their affirmative marketing efforts in the United States. There is nothing unfair about 
permitting the surviving members of the Herzog family to sue Hungary . . . .”). 
 127. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1108; see United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, 
at 16 (“[I]t is very unlikely that Congress intended for jurisdiction to be ‘dispensed in gross . . . .’ ” 
(citation omitted)). 
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make this interpretation clear: “[A] foreign state shall not be immune 
from suit.”128 To conclude otherwise would require reading the word 
“not” out of the text129 or determining that the drafters of the FSIA 
intended to confer an elevated status on the foreign state as compared 
to its agencies and instrumentalities.130 
Supporters of this approach also argue that this difference 
between jurisdictional requirements for foreign states versus their 
agencies and instrumentalities is not supported by the plain language 
of the statute or the legislative history.131 Section 1603(a) of the FSIA 
defines “foreign state” to include its agencies and instrumentalities, 
which undercuts the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning that the agencies and 
instrumentalities are totally severable from the foreign state itself.132 
Further, the relevant House Report clearly adopts this definition to 
apply to the expropriation exception.133 
Advocates for the Ninth Circuit’s either-or approach also assert 
that the reliance on nebulous “background” principles supporting a 
distinction between foreign states and their instrumentalities in the 
FSIA is incorrect.134 Congress enacted the FSIA to replace these 
background rules and codify a specific, discrete standard by which 
foreign sovereign immunity attaches.135  
 
 128. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1111 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). Judge Randolph did not mince words. Id. at 1110 (“[T]he majority’s 
opinion transforms the governing jurisdictional statute to mean the opposite of what it says.”).  
 129. Id. at 1111 (“Although § 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from 
suit, the majority crosses out the ‘not’ and holds that the foreign state shall be immune when its 
agencies or instrumentalities owning or operating the expropriated property engage in commercial 
activity in the United States.”). 
 130. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 7 (“Hungary extrapolates from those 
provisions a free-floating principle that a foreign sovereign should always be afforded more 
favorable treatment under the FSIA than its agencies or instrumentalities, even when the FSIA 
provides otherwise.”). 
 131. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1112 n.1 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“This supposed neat distinction between foreign states and their instrumentalities is belied 
not only by the Act defining ‘foreign state’ to include agencies and instrumentalities, . . . but also 
by the House Report on the Act explicitly adopting this definition for the expropriation exception.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2012) (“A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, 
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state . . . .”); see de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1112 n.1 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (explaining that the expropriation exception includes agencies and instrumentalities in its 
definition of “foreign state”).  
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18–19 (1976) (“Section 1605 sets forth the general 
circumstances in which a claim of sovereign immunity by a foreign state, as defined in section 
1603(a), would not be recognized in a Federal or State court in the United States.”); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1603(a) (“A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political 
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”).  
 134. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 8. 
 135. Id. 
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Reading the exception to establish different jurisdictional 
thresholds might also lead to odd results.136 For example, in the de 
Csepel case, defendant Hungary argued that it could not possibly be 
subject to jurisdiction under the FSIA’s expropriation exception because 
the property was in Hungary, not the United States, and it had not 
engaged in commercial activities in connection with the property at 
issue, thus failing the first prong of § 1605(a)(3).137 However, once the 
D.C. Circuit ordered the trial court to dismiss Hungary as a 
defendant,138 the remaining defendants (the agencies and 
instrumentalities) argued that the case could not go further because 
Hungary was a “necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
19.”139 The defendants argued there was no available relief for the 
Herzog family unless Hungary was a party, as Hungary owned the 
property at issue and was the party that committed the 
expropriation.140 While the district court has yet to rule on the 
defendants’ Rule 19 argument,141 it seems unlikely that Congress 
intended the expropriation exception to create such an escape clause for 
foreign states to evade jurisdiction.142 
Additionally, the alternative threshold approach’s reading of 
§ 1605(a)(3) makes the expropriation exception ineffective as it relates 
to foreign states.143 To avoid jurisdiction under the alternative 
threshold approach, foreign states need only abstain from sending the 
property to the United States for a commercial activity.144 This 
effectively quashes any chance for a plaintiff to gain jurisdiction over a 
foreign sovereign in an art suit because foreign states, cognizant of this 
jurisdictional prerequisite, will simply avoid bringing the property to 
the United States.145 
 
 136. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 27–28. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 27. 
 139. Id. at 28. 
 140. Id. at 27–28. 
      141.   See de Csepel et al v. Republic of Hungary et al Court Docket Sheet, DOCKETBIRD, 
https://www.docketbird.com/court-cases/De-Csepel-et-al-v-Republic-of-Hungary-et-al/dcd-1:2010-
cv-01261 [https://perma.cc/3DJD-PP9X] (showing that the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 
their Rule 19 argument on February 9, 2018, but the court has yet to issue an order on the merits 
of that argument). 
 142. Id. at 28. 
 143. See id. at 31 (“The panel majority’s interpretation thus renders toothless a provision that 
purports to remove a foreign state’s immunity—based on a contorted view of the term ‘foreign 
state’ that excludes foreign states. Congress could not have intended that bizarre result.”). 
 144. Id. (“[U]nder the D.C. Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of the expropriation exception, a 
foreign state could retain its immunity to suit merely by refraining from bringing the expropriated 
property . . . to the United States in connection with a commercial activity.”). 
 145. See id. (explaining that foreign states may easily avoid jurisdiction by keeping the art out 
of the United States). 
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D. Practical Effects 
The resolution of this circuit split will likely have broader 
implications than simply plaintiffs’ ability to sue in U.S. courts. In fact, 
a resolution favoring less immunity and more court access could lead to 
tensions between foreign sovereigns and the United States.146 Through 
the FSIA, Congress attempted to prevent immunity blunders with other 
countries,147 and an either-or approach to the expropriation exception 
could undercut this goal because it would permit a district court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign-state defendant more freely. A U.S. 
court exercising jurisdiction over a foreign nation is a delicate matter, 
and international comity demands some degree of deference to other 
states.148 The narrow interpretations of other FSIA exceptions and the 
establishment of the FSIA as the exclusive means for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state animate these concerns.149 The 
distinction between a foreign state and its agencies and 
instrumentalities demonstrates the desire for parity between nations 
that is carefully enshrined in the FSIA.150  
Further, a more liberal approach to jurisdiction in Nazi-era loot 
cases will likely discourage the exchange of culturally significant 
artwork between countries.151 Foreign nations are already wary of 
loaning their artwork to the United States as they fear it will lead to 
lawsuits for disputed pieces. Russia, for example, has stopped loaning 
 
 146. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 17, Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 
F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 17-7146), 2018 WL 2461996, at *17 [hereinafter United States 
Amicus Brief in Simon] (“[When] the United States has expressed its foreign policy interests in 
connection with a particular subject matter or litigation, a court should give substantial weight to 
the United States’ views that those interests support (or weigh against) abstention in favor of a 
foreign forum that can resolve the dispute.”). The preceding quote specifically speaks to the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens as it relates to international comity, but the principles also apply 
to why a court may decide to more narrowly interpret jurisdictional requirements.  
 147. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320. 
 148. See id. at 320 (discussing the dissatisfaction with the immunity determination process 
pre–FSIA). 
 149. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 822 (2018) (“Congress enacted the 
FSIA in an effort to codify this careful balance between respecting the immunity historically 
afforded to foreign sovereigns and holding them accountable, in certain circumstances, for their 
actions.”). 
 150. See id. (“ ‘For the most part, the Act’ tracks ‘the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity.’ ” (quoting Verlinden V.B. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983))). 
 151. See Wuerth, supra note 90 (discussing the Art Museum Amendment to the FSIA, also 
known as The Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act or FCEJCA, 
which provides that artwork loaned to the United States for temporary display falls outside the 
meaning of “commercial activity,” and therefore outside of the expropriation exception in the FSIA, 
to facilitate the exchange of artwork between nations). 
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artwork to the United States altogether.152 To ameliorate this concern 
and facilitate art exchange, Congress passed the Foreign Cultural 
Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act (“FCEJCA”) to 
amend the FSIA. The FCEJCA authorizes the president to designate 
foreign states’ exhibition of artwork in the United States as outside of 
the scope of the “commercial activity” categorization under certain 
circumstances.153 The president is not entitled to make such a 
designation for works subject to “Nazi-era claims,” however, leaving 
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities vulnerable to 
claims like the Herzogs’.154  
The denial of jurisdiction in U.S. courts may reflect the desire to 
protect the United States from judicial interference abroad.155 The Tate 
Letter explained this goal and cited reciprocity as a primary motive in 
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.156 Because other 
states failed to extend immunity to the United States in their own 
courts, Tate argued that the United States should not extend this 
immunity to other governments in domestic courts.157 This argument 
goes both ways—if the United States wants to remain immune abroad 
for expropriation suits, it would do well to offer the same immunity to 
foreign nations in U.S. courts. Perhaps the reason the United States is 
not keen to extend jurisdiction in the context of expropriations is the 
recognition that this would make the United States vulnerable to 
jurisdiction for these types of acts in other nations. The United States 
would be justified in fearing a quid pro quo retaliation of this sort but, 
in turn, it would relinquish its moral authority.  
Failure to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in Nazi-era 
art suits arguably undermines the consensus established by the 
international community in previous international agreements.158 In 
the decades following the Holocaust, nations, nongovernmental 
 
 152. Id. (“The [Malewicz] case had a ripple effect in the art world. Foreign states rescinded or 
refused to temporarily loan art to museums in the U.S. for fear of being sued.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 319–20 (“[T]he granting of sovereign immunity to 
foreign governments in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the 
Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract 
and tort . . . .” (quoting Tate Letter, supra note 36, at 984)).  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 15, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.) 
(No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 1470233, at *15 [hereinafter Eizenstat Brief] (“[The D.C. Circuit’s decision] 
is inconsistent with the broad international consensus reflected in the multilateral 
declarations . . . that States play a key role in facilitating just and fair solutions for victims of 
Holocaust-era expropriation.”). 
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organizations, and advocacy groups have made a global push to 
facilitate art restitution for victims—the United States and multiple 
former Nazi-aligned countries have signed various declarations and 
agreements claiming steadfast support for victims.159 For example, the 
Washington Conference Principles implored that nations aid the effort 
to return stolen artworks by identifying these stolen works and making 
that information public.160 These instruments, though not legally 
binding, make clear that states shoulder substantial responsibility to 
rectify these wrongs.161 To hold otherwise would belie decades of 
international progress.162  
Additionally, the alternative threshold approach bypasses some 
of the practical realities of enforcing judgments against agencies and 
instrumentalities of foreign governments.163 Agencies and 
instrumentalities may be able to avoid execution of judgments more 
easily by keeping an insufficient number of assets in the United States, 
effectively making them judgment proof.164 This would make it 
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to enforce their awards;165 of course, on 
the other hand, a foreign-state defendant could employ the same 
strategy. Nevertheless, without a U.S. forum, aggrieved plaintiffs 
would be forced to pursue recourse in the defendant country, which can 
often lead to a long slog of procedural hurdles and likely a “home court 
advantage” for the foreign-state defendant in the foreign forum.166 The 
 
 159. Id. at 9–11 (listing the international agreements affirming support and restitution for 
Holocaust survivors like the Washington Conference Principles, the Vilnius Forum Declaration, 
and the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues). 
 160. Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has “The Lost Museum” Been Found? 
Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity 
to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 141 
(2002). 
 161. See Eizenstat Brief, supra note 158, at 9 (“Although such declarations are not legally 
enforceable, this declaration [the Washington Conference Principles] and those that followed 
reflect the recognition by the signatories of the responsibilities that States bear in the process of 
returning artworks to their rightful owners.”). 
 162. See id. at 7 (“For decades, the U.S. government has lent the weight of its authority, and 
considerable resources, to urging foreign States to help bring justice to victims of the Holocaust 
and their heirs.”). 
 163. See id. at 17 (“[T]he participation of foreign sovereigns is vital to . . . resolving these 
claims. The decision below . . . would deprive claimants of an important mechanism for holding 
foreign States accountable for restoring to the claimants their property that was expropriated as 
part of Nazi-era crimes.”). 
 164. See id. at 24–25 (“[A]s a practical matter, agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign State 
may not have sufficient assets in the United States that are subject to attachment to satisfy a 
judgment . . . .”). 
 165. See id. at 25 (“[A]gencies or instrumentalities can more readily avoid the execution of 
judgments than can foreign States themselves, thus frustrating attempts to achieve a measure of 
justice.”).  
 166. For example, the State Department’s 2018 Hungary Human Rights Report noted an 
increased number of “reports of political pressure on judges by senior members of the government.” 
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Altmann and de Csepel litigations are instructive on this point. Before 
Maria Altmann attempted to sue in the United States, she pursued her 
claims in Austria, where the art restitution committee refused to return 
her stolen works.167 Thereafter, she attempted to sue in Austrian court, 
but was told that to pursue her claims she would have to put down 1.2 
percent of the estimated value of her award (plus 13,180 Austrian 
schillings168)—the amount in controversy was $135 million.169 She 
would have had to pay $1.6 million to get into court.170 Because of the 
prohibitive cost of the effort, she dropped the lawsuit in Austria and 
sued in the United States.171 Likewise, after the Herzogs initially won 
the return of eleven pieces in Hungary, an appellate court reversed the 
decision.172 Twelve years after Hungary failed to follow through on its 
commitment to appoint a state commissioner to investigate the claims 
of Holocaust victims—a promise it made at the Washington 
Conference—the Herzogs brought suit in the United States.173 
Further, applying the alternative threshold approach in Nazi-
era looted art cases does not account for the U.S. government’s 
expressed interest in art restitution for Holocaust victims and their 
descendants domestically.174 For example, under the FCEJCA—
enacted to facilitate art exhibition in the United States175—the 
president is not entitled to waive the expropriation exception for works 
subject to “Nazi-era claims.”176 To the extent this and other 
 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUNGARY 2018 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/hungary-2018-
human-rights-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AFU-UPGM]. Where the defendant is the foreign state 
itself, one can imagine that the pressure on the judiciary would not be insignificant.   
 167. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 
514 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 168. In today’s dollars, that would amount to about $1,036. Austrian schilling (ATS) to US 
dollar (USD) Converter, MATAF.NET, https://www.mataf.net/en/currency/converter-ATS-
USD?m1=13180 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5UHX-DPC4]. 
 169. Altmann, 317 F.3d at 961. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 258–59. 
 173. Id. at 259. 
 174. Eizenstat Brief, supra note 158, at 12–13: 
The U.S. government undertook a number of measures to put the Washington 
Conference Principles into practice. It encouraged its private museums and the 
National Gallery of Art to return Nazi-looted art in their collection, and worked with 
the U.S. art museum directors association as the U.S. museums investigated the 
provenance of their art collections in the search for Nazi-looted art. 
 175. Id. at 13–14 (“[The FCEJCA] provides that the temporary exhibition in the United States 
of artworks owned by a foreign State is not ‘commercial activity’ by that State . . . if the President 
determines in advance that the work is of ‘cultural significance’ and the display of the work is in 
the ‘national interest.’ ”). 
 176. Id. at 14. 
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congressional initiatives show that Congress intended to encourage the 
return of looted art, it buttresses the theory that Congress would 
support more initiatives to facilitate the return of this stolen 
property.177  
The price for an approach that is the most sensitive to 
international comity concerns is access foreclosure—the alternative 
threshold approach will unquestionably prevent litigants from bringing 
their claims in the United States.178 Further, research suggests that 
access denial in the forum state can bar claims in another country’s 
judicial system.179 This problem is especially acute when the litigant is 
a U.S. citizen, since one of the stated purposes of the FSIA was to 
provide a forum for aggrieved plaintiffs.180 The alternative threshold 
approach effectively creates a “how-to manual for foreign states to 
deprive expropriation victims of the U.S. judicial forum provided by 
Congress.”181  
Supporters of the alternative threshold approach counter that 
the United States should not serve as a forum for all Nazi-era looted art 
claims—victims and states are better served by litigating where the 
alleged theft took place because the foreign forum will likely have better 
access to relevant evidence and witnesses.182 The United States is not 
the world’s courtroom, nor does its judiciary have the resources to act 
 
 177. See id. at 12–14 (describing the U.S. government’s efforts to support the notion that 
Congress favors restitution for Holocaust victims); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, 
at 25 (“Congress has enacted multiple laws intended to remove remaining obstacles to the just 
resolution of those claims.”). 
 178. Take the plaintiffs in the de Csepel action—the denial of certiorari ensures they will not 
be able to bring a claim against Hungary.  
 179. Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 2033, 2076–77 (2013): 
Nevertheless, it appears that in many cases in which a U.S. court denies court access 
on foreign state immunity grounds, the foreign state lacks robust judicial independence 
or rule of law according to a variety of measures, and may therefore fail to provide a 
meaningful alternative forum for the plaintiff’s claim against the foreign state. In such 
circumstances, a decision to deny U.S. court access may be tantamount to a decision to 
deny meaningful court access altogether. 
 180. See id. at 2071: 
Denial of court access [based on foreign-state immunity] is especially serious when it 
occurs in the [plaintiff’s] home country. In such a case, the very government that 
demands loyalty from, and thus owes protection to, the plaintiff, refuses to assist him 
in the vindication of his . . . rights. 
(alterations in original) (quoting Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign 
Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403, 419 
(1995)).  
 181. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 9.  
 182. See United States Amicus Brief in Simon, supra note 146, at 25–26 (discussing how forum 
non conveniens helps identify cases that should be litigated in a different forum). Though this brief 
does not discuss these concerns in the context of the expropriation exception issue discussed in 
this Note, its points are still instructive. 
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as such.183 But for families like the Herzogs, who have tried and failed 
to pursue recourse in a foreign state, the United States may be the only 
option.184 However, as noted in Part IV, there are other ways for the 
U.S. government to help resolve these claims without the federal 
judiciary.185 
III. BEYOND NAZI-ERA LOOTED ART CLAIMS: FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
The expropriation exception, while a major conduit for Nazi-era 
art looting suits, is not cabined to these claims.186 Taking a closer look 
at the other types of claims that fall within FSIA’s expropriation 
exception—specifically foreign direct investment—demonstrates why 
Nazi-looted art plaintiffs face unique challenges in their pursuit of 
relief. And why, as a result, their claims might need more creative 
thinking to effectuate that relief. 
The typical foreign direct investment suit occurs when a foreign 
state illegally187 nationalizes or appropriates the property of a company 
operating in that foreign state. If this happens, the affected company 
can bring suit under the expropriation exception.188 Recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to permit 
broad access to U.S. courts for these types of claims.189 In Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 
the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the 
pleading standard for a taking in violation of international law, 
concluding that it was not sufficient merely to present a nonfrivolous 
argument that a taking occurred.190 Rather, the plaintiff must show, 
“(and not just arguably show) a taking of property in violation of 
international law.”191 Put another way, courts will not accept a “party’s 
nonfrivolous, but ultimately incorrect, argument that property was 
taken in violation of international law” as enough to confer 
 
 183. See id. at 26 (litigating in the foreign forum could avoid “years of litigation over 
jurisdictional issues”). 
 184. See O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 345 (“[I]t may well be that a wavering commitment to 
the Washington Principles means that litigation in America will increase.”). 
 185. See infra Part IV. 
 186. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (containing no 
language that limits expropriation claims to Nazi-loot suits). 
 187. The taking must violate international law in some way. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 
1312, 1324 (2017) (rejecting a lower pleading standard for expropriation claims thus limiting which 
claims can proceed to the merits). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. See supra Section I.C (explaining what “taking” means under the FSIA).  
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jurisdiction.192 While this is not directly related to the issue at hand, 
this holding demonstrates the Court’s willingness to narrow the scope 
of claims that fall under the expropriation exception.193 
The Ninth Circuit’s either-or approach would increase U.S. court 
access for U.S. businesses whose property was appropriated by foreign 
governments abroad.194 This raises the same international comity and 
judicial efficiency concerns noted above; however, suits arising out of 
Nazi-era stolen art claims and those emerging from expropriated 
business property claims are worth distinguishing. As it stands, Nazi-
looted art plaintiffs have limited effective options for favorably 
resolving their claims.  
Historically, investors whose property had been expropriated by 
a foreign state had little recourse.195 Individuals could not file suits 
against foreign states, so they were forced to rely on their home state to 
espouse the claim on their behalf.196 Home states often declined to 
pursue action for fear of damaging their foreign policy goals.197 If a 
foreign government took their property, the companies were left with 
few avenues for restitution.198 The expropriation exception of the FSIA 
ameliorates these concerns to a degree, allowing companies to sue 
foreign states for takings.199 However, modern investment treaties offer 
an even more appealing resolution mechanism—arbitration.200 
Many companies pursue their claims under the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (“ICSID”) rules, though 
this is not the exclusive means of arbitration.201 Arbitration offers a 
favorable alternative to traditional litigation for many reasons: private 
parties can initiate the proceedings (sovereigns cannot), investors can 
choose the “forum, timing, rules, and legal issues that get litigated”;202 
parties appoint the arbitrators;203 and financial awards are not 
 
 192. Helmerich, 137 S. Ct. at 1316. 
 193. See id. at 1318–22 (analyzing the pleading standard for expropriation claims in the 
context of the FSIA’s history and objectives). 
 194. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 26 (“Although this case highlights 
the importance of the question presented to Holocaust survivors and their heirs, the issue is also 
important to U.S. businesses that have property or otherwise do business abroad.”). 
 195. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 694. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. (outlining how an investor could be stonewalled in pursuing legal action). 
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). 
 200. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 694, 707–08. 
 201. Id. at 694. 
 202. Id. at 707. 
 203. Id. at 708 (“[C]ritics note that some individuals are virtually always appointed as 
arbitrator by claimants, that others are virtually always selected by states, and that virtually all 
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appealable.204 In fact, the terms of arbitration are so favorable to 
investors that some countries have opted not to participate in 
arbitration for such claims at all.205 
In contrast, victims of Nazi looting may have no viable 
alternative for pursuing their claims.206 The many attempted initiatives 
to compensate survivors fall short. For example, under the 
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, one of the Herzog heirs, 
Erzsebét Weiss de Csepel, filed a claim with the Foreign Claims 
Settlement Commission to receive a payout for nationalized real 
property and twelve paintings in the family’s collection.207 She was 
awarded $210,000—less than one percent of the $100 million figure that 
the heirs now claim they are owed.208 Moreover, in 1973, Hungary 
concluded an executive agreement with the United States providing an 
$18.9 million lump sum to settle all claims by U.S. nationals against 
Hungary.209 The plaintiffs in the de Csepel case understandably would 
not want to pursue relief through this mechanism. First, their claims 
are much more valuable than the expected payout—the de Csepel 
plaintiffs’ claims alone amount to $100 million, more than five times 
what the fund was established to hold. Second, the agreements create 
limited process for the plaintiffs—there is simply a monetary payout; 
the 1973 Agreement provides no means for securing the return of looted 
art. Third, as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
explained, this agreement is nonbinding on plaintiffs who were not U.S. 
citizens during the Holocaust.210 Thus, as many Holocaust survivors did 
not move to the United States to become citizens until after the 
Holocaust, they were not required to utilize this agreement for a payout 
 
dissents written by party-appointed arbitrators are written in favor of the party who appointed 
them.”). 
 204. Id. at 704 (“Under the 1965 treaty creating ICSID, domestic courts do not have authority 
to stay, compel, or review ICSID tribunals. At the same time, ICSID provides a limited mechanism 
for challenging awards.”). 
 205. Id. at 708: 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention. Others 
announced plans to limit or eliminate their exposure to ISDS [investor-state dispute 
settlement]. For example, in 2011, the Australian government announced that it would 
not include ISDS in future BITs [bilateral investment treaties] and regional trade 
agreements . . . . 
 206. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for 
Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 165–66 (2007) (explaining how the 
myriad of restitution mechanisms available to Holocaust survivors do not cover looted art). 
      207.   de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 124 (D.D.C. 2011). 
      208.   Id. 
 209. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic Regarding the Settlement of Claims, Hung.-U.S., 
Mar. 6, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 522. 
 210. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 169 F. Supp. 3d 143, 167 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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and had little incentive to do so. Fourth, the 1973 Agreement’s claims 
payout process was completed in 1977—even if the Herzog heirs wanted 
to file claims through this Agreement, they would not be able to.211 
Plaintiffs can also pursue recourse in the country where their 
art was taken, but critics say these European commissions on 
restitution are known for stonewalling, a lack of transparency, and 
foregone conclusions.212 When it first began its work, Austria’s art 
restitution commission was “synonymous with a lack of transparency 
and predetermined outcomes.”213 Likewise, Germany’s art commission 
is criticized for not hearing enough cases and establishing a slow 
process that requires both parties to consent to the forum.214 
Some countries do not have any organized restitution 
commission at all—Hungary, for example, has no historical commission 
to investigate Hungary’s role in art theft, nor has it initiated any 
research into the provenance of the art in its museums.215 There is no 
international tribunal dedicated to resolving these disputes, though 
commentators have called for one.216 Weighed against the possibility 
that these looted art plaintiffs have no avenue for restitution, 
international comity and judicial administration concerns seem to 
shrink, especially when compared to the litigation alternatives 
available to U.S. businesses.  
Further, while the appropriation of U.S. business property is 
certainly of paramount concern, Nazi-era art looting claims are, quite 
frankly, materially different. The need for justice in the realm of Nazi-
looted art is more acute—foreign governments perpetrated these 
takings in pursuit of the systematic annihilation of an entire people.217 
 
 211. Completed Programs—Hungary, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (July 28, 2014), www.justice.gov 
/fcsc/completed-programs-hungary [https://perma.cc/K8ST-HFFX]. 
 212. O’ DONNELL, supra note 3, at 310–11. 
 213. Id. Not all commissions are universally derided; in recent years, many have commended 
the Austrian Art Restitution Advisory Board for its meticulous work. Id. at 311. 
 214. Catherine Hickley, Washington Principles: The Restitution of Nazi-Looted Art Is Still a 
Work in Progress, 20 Years on, ART NEWSPAPER (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:47 BST), 
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/restitution-of-nazi-looted-art-a-work-in-progress 
[https://perma.cc/FB7F-FVDJ]. 
 215. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 344 (quoting Wesley A. Fisher & Ruth Weinberger, 
Holocaust-Era Looted Art: A Current World-Wide View, WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG., 
http://art.claimscon.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Worldwide-Overview.pdf (last updated Nov. 
13, 2014) [https://perma.cc/9PVN-DSJ8]) (“While a few restitutions have taken place, important 
works of art have consistently been kept from being restituted to their rightful owners.”)). 
 216. See Kreder, supra note 206, at 156–57 (proposing the creation of “an international 
tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction to resolve all such disputes and clear title to artwork”); 
Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an 
International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 230 (2006).  
 217. See Art Stolen by the Nazis, supra note 2 (“During World War II, the Nazis looted some 
600,000 paintings from Jews, at least 100,000 of which are still missing. The looting was not only 
5_Tenkhoff (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:29 PM 
2020] HOLOCAUST-ERA ART RESTITUTION 599 
The alleged crimes are especially heinous, making the need for relief all 
the more pressing. 
IV. A WAY FORWARD: EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION TO HELP 
REMEDIATE NAZI-LOOTED ART CLAIMS 
The executive branch should work with former Nazi-aligned 
regimes to conclude a series of executive agreements that provide relief 
for Holocaust survivors and their descendants seeking the return of 
looted art.  
Both foreign sovereigns and plaintiffs would benefit from 
executive branch action providing another way forward. As it stands, 
jurisdiction over foreign states depends on the circuit in which they are 
sued, which undercuts the purpose of the FSIA and helps neither the 
victims nor the foreign states they seek to hold accountable. The 
Supreme Court declined to grant the de Csepel petition for writ of 
certiorari,218 so a definitive judicial solution is neither imminent nor 
guaranteed. And these types of claims will not go away.219 Moreover, 
the possibility of congressional action on this issue is very unlikely—
while Congress has indeed signaled a willingness to legislate in the 
areas of Nazi-looted art claims, the expropriation exception is not 
cabined to these types of claims. It covers other suits for stolen 
property,220 which could be affected by a congressional attempt to clarify 
the statutory language of the FSIA. Any congressional action to expand 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns would come with weighty foreign 
policy considerations, while any attempt to limit jurisdiction in this 
area could yield political consequences amongst people rightfully 
sympathetic to the survivors’ plight. Even more importantly, the last 
time Congress attempted to lower a jurisdictional threshold against a 
foreign state, President Obama vetoed it (though Congress overrode the 
President’s veto and the legislation still passed).221 Here, where 
 
designed to enrich the Third Reich but also integral to the Holocaust’s goal of eliminating all 
vestiges of Jewish identity and culture.”). 
 218. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 219. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 25 (“Nor is there anything to 
suggest that Holocaust-era expropriation claims will soon fade away. To the contrary, decades of 
significant obstacles to resolving such claims have ensured that the opposite is true.”). 
 220. See supra Part III.  
 221. Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Congress Votes to Override 
Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-
victims-bill.html [https://perma.cc/8DAJ-Z37Y]; Seung Min Kim, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill, 
POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:35 PM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-jasta-
228548 [https://perma.cc/9RUQ-U2RL]. 
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permitting jurisdiction against former Nazi regimes would likely anger 
modern-day allies, such as Germany, a presidential veto seems likely.  
If Congress were to enact a statute allowing for federal court 
jurisdiction over former Nazi-aligned regimes for expropriation claims, 
it would arguably be a violation of international law as understood by 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Germany v. Italy.222 There, 
the ICJ held that allowing suit against Germany in Italian courts for 
jus cogens violations—international law norms that cannot be 
derogated from—contravened customary international law norms that 
granted immunity to foreign sovereigns.223 The grant of immunity has 
nothing to do with the underlying allegations but rather the identity of 
the actor being sued—and courts across the world rejected the jus 
cogens argument as a justification for waiving immunity.224 
Rather than wait for the Supreme Court or Congress to act, the 
executive branch can—and should—do what it does best: conduct the 
business of foreign relations. The President and the State Department 
should work to design a series of executive agreements with former 
Nazi-aligned regimes to reduce the threat of litigation in the U.S. 
federal court system. The executive agreements should be two-fold. 
First, in exchange for agreeing to enter arbitration with potential U.S. 
art claimants and neutral arbitrators, the U.S. government would 
pledge to file briefs in cases where these foreign sovereigns were 
defendants. Those briefs would explain that it is in the United States’ 
foreign policy interest that the parties arbitrate rather than litigate in 
U.S. courts.225 Given the judiciary’s historical reluctance to intrude 
upon the foreign policy interests of the federal government,226 such a 
statement is likely to carry significant weight. Second, the United 
States should establish a trust where Holocaust survivors with 
 
 222. Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 91 (Feb. 
3). 
 223. Id. at ¶¶ 92–97. 
 224. Id. at ¶ 91 (“[U]nder customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not 
deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international 
human rights law or the international law of armed conflict.”). 
 225. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–06 (2003) (describing a similar 
situation where the federal government would provide a statement that the foreign policy of the 
United States favored resolving the disputes in an alternate forum).  
 226. See, e.g., Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of 
the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 216 (1985) (“It seems incredible that after two 
hundred years of life under a written constitution which delineates governmental power and its 
allocation, and which creates a Supreme Court to definitively determine controversies about power 
and its allocation, the most basic questions concerning allocation of the foreign affairs power 
remain unanswered.”).  
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legitimate art restitution claims may opt for a monetary restitution in 
lieu of arbitrating with a foreign government.227 
Admittedly, this solution does not solve all the problems 
surrounding the expropriation exception circuit split—foreign states 
still will not know whether they can be sued in the United States under 
a lower jurisdictional threshold. But this lack of clarity could serve one 
purpose—as leverage against foreign states who might be reluctant to 
agree to arbitration in lieu of litigation. As it stands, a foreign state that 
is sued outside of the D.C. and Second Circuits will likely not be able to 
take advantage of a stricter read of the FSIA.228 If the foreign state is 
sued in the Ninth Circuit and the plaintiff can satisfy the lower 
jurisdictional threshold, it will have to litigate.229 If it is sued in a circuit 
that has not yet decided the expropriation exception issue, it will have 
to roll the dice. And a plaintiff who meets the higher jurisdictional 
threshold, while unlikely, will still be able to sue the foreign state in the 
D.C. and Second Circuits. As a result, foreign states should be more 
likely to agree to arbitration.230 
More importantly, arbitration can offer a favorable alternative 
to the long and expensive slog of litigation for foreign states. And while 
many of the concerns that animate the efficacy of state-run art 
restitution commissions hold water here,231 arbitration has been shown 
to afford survivors extremely favorable outcomes. For example, Maria 
Altmann, from the Altmann litigation, received five of her family’s 
Klimt paintings after an arbitration with Austria.232 Altmann then 
went on to sell one of the pieces—the famous portrait of Adele Bloch-
Bauer (or the “Woman in Gold” as it is commonly known)—for $135 
million.233 Additionally, as noted above,234 plaintiffs with other types of 
expropriation exception claims have an arbitral option—companies 
whose business assets are expropriated can go to ICSID for relief. 
While this Note does not endeavor to draw up the complex 
scheme that would necessarily govern these types of claims, a few 
 
 227. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405–06 (discussing a “voluntary compensation fund” which 
could provide restitution if the parties waived any legal claims in the United States). 
 228. See supra Section II.A. 
 229. See supra Section II.B. 
 230. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405 (discussing how German companies were willing to create 
a voluntary compensation fund to avoid litigation). 
 231. See supra Part III. 
 232. Patricia Cohen, The Story Behind ‘Woman in Gold’: Nazi Art Thieves and One Painting’s 
Return, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/arts/design/the-story-
behind-woman-in-gold-nazi-art-thieves-and-one-paintings-return.html [https://perma.cc/X5CE-
33SZ]. 
 233. Id.  
 234. See supra Part III. 
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things are worth noting. First, establishing a procedure for appointing 
neutral arbiters is essential. As mentioned in Part III, the appearance 
of partial arbiters can damage the credibility of the tribunal and cause 
foreign states to lose confidence in its results.235 Second, to the extent 
the arbitral tribunal can institute mechanisms to ensure transparency 
and expediency, it would ameliorate many of the problems associated 
with state-run art commissions.236 Such mechanisms could include 
publication of the arbitral tribunal’s outcomes or punitive sanctions for 
dilatory tactics by the parties. Third, any arbitration scheme should 
conform to the New York Convention and its domestic counterpart, the 
Federal Arbitration Act.237  
As an alternative to arbitration, survivors with legitimate stolen 
art claims could also opt to be compensated through the executive-
initiated trust. Multiple organizations exist to facilitate survivors’ 
research.238 The trust can work with these organizations—or establish 
a new one—to secure information about missing art, archival 
information, and provenance research.239 This trust would be 
responsible for setting up a new suite of procedures for sifting through 
stolen art claims and determining which are viable and what level of 
compensation is appropriate. Admittedly, a trust that compensates 
families for stolen (and valuable) artwork will likely require quite a 
large endowment to provide claimants with adequate restitution. But 
faced with the cost of litigating these claims for years on end in U.S. 
courts (the de Csepel litigation has been going on for almost ten years), 
providing monetary payments to aggrieved plaintiffs could be a better 
alternative. 
This proposal follows similar agreements the U.S. government 
has negotiated with France, Germany, and Austria for Holocaust-era 
insurance claims.240 These agreements could provide the framework for 
 
 235. See supra Part III. 
 236. See supra Part III. 
 237. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
 238. International Organizations, CLAIMS CONFERENCE/WJRO, LOOTED ART & CULTURAL 
PROP. INITIATIVE, http://art.claimscon.org/home-new/resources/overview-of-worldwide-looted-art-
and-provenance-research-databases/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FV9K-8BFA] 
(listing a number of organizations that assist with art recovery). 
 239. See Databases, COMM’N FOR ART RECOVERY, http://www.commartrecovery.org/databases 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W4R7-8Z4J] (providing an organization whose 
purpose is to assist in the post-Holocaust art restitution efforts). 
 240. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–08 (2003); see, e.g., Agreement 
Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Fr.-U.S., Jan. 18, 2001, 
State Dep’t No. 01-36, 2001 WL 416465 [hereinafter Agreement Concerning Payments]. While 
these funds have been criticized for failing victims, weighed against the policy of no monetary 
compensation for their stolen art at all, it is better than the alternative. Joanne S. Hogan, Note, 
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi: The Power of the Executive Agreement, 18 TEMP. INT’L & 
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designing the trust for art claims, which should include a dedicated 
fund with compensation money, the regular issuance of public reports 
regarding progress in compensating victims, a burden of proof scheme 
for establishing title to disputed artworks, and an appeals mechanism 
for those victims who are initially denied restitution.241 The most crucial 
element of this trust fund will be constituting it with sufficient funds to 
reasonably compensate plaintiffs who are seeking restitution for very 
valuable items. Unlike the trust created by the 1973 Agreement 
between Hungary and the United States, there will likely be far fewer 
claimants pursuing much higher dollar amounts. Realistically, most 
claimants will not be able to get the full value of their stolen relics (some 
of which carry a significant price tag). But for plaintiffs who are not 
interested in going to arbitration (or pursuing litigation in the United 
States or elsewhere), this could be a favorable alternative. 
Even more critically, survivors will not be required to pursue 
relief through this fund. They may opt to go to arbitration instead, as 
noted above, which could yield more creative and beneficial outcomes 
than a court order in favor of one party or the other. Plaintiffs like the 
de Csepels, who allege $100 million in stolen art, would be more likely 
to fight for the return of their art in arbitration. A family with a single 
stolen art piece, on the other hand, might be more amenable to being 
paid out of the compensation fund rather than seeking relief through 
arbitration or litigation. Importantly, survivors and their descendants 
will have a choice between alternatives that do not involve “endless 
litigation.”242 
CONCLUSION 
The executive branch should step in to provide relief to 
Holocaust survivors while also protecting its foreign policy interests 
and the presumption against suing foreign sovereigns in the U.S. 
federal court system. It can do this through a series of executive 
agreements that encourage arbitration or compensation through an 
 
COMP. L.J. 431, 446–51 (2004). Concededly, compensation for looted art claims will likely be 
costlier than the disputed life insurance policies this model is based on; however, there are 
probably far fewer claimants. See id. at 437 (noting there were over five hundred thousand names 
of survivors who were owed insurance policies); Eizenstat, supra note 2 (explaining that one 
hundred thousand pieces of Nazi-looted art are still missing). Though, it seems unlikely that there 
are even one hundred thousand viable looted art claims—the passage of time has undoubtedly 
culled this number significantly. 
 241. See Agreement Concerning Payments, supra note 240, at *4–6 (providing the general 
terms of the agreement). 
 242. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405 (quoting United States Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright).  
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established trust. While such executive action will not guarantee 
restitution, it will ensure that survivors have the option to engage the 
foreign state to seek restitution. While this is concededly a small 
measure of justice for Holocaust victims, it is a measure of justice 
nonetheless. 
No amount of litigation, restitution, or money judgments can 
cure what happened seven decades ago. But by working with foreign 
states to remediate these thefts, the United States can help ameliorate, 
bit by bit, the systematic destruction of European Jewish culture. 
Earlier, this Note posited that sometimes the most moral result is not 
the most practical one.243 Here, the U.S. government has the 





 243. See supra Section I.C. 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2020, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.J., 2014, University of 
Missouri. To Professor Ingrid Wuerth, for her thoughtful guidance and mentoring throughout this 
process. To my friends and editors on the Vanderbilt Law Review, for graciously giving their time 
to work on this piece. To my parents and sisters for their unrelenting support. And finally, to my 
grandfather George P. Rédei—a geneticist, professor, survivor, and my first and favorite teacher—
for showing me the meaning of tenacity and the value of curiosity. 
